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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, DARK WEB DRUG DEALERS, 
AND THE OPIOID CRISIS
Katharine Stewart*
Abstract
This Note addresses whether people who use criminal aliases to send 
drugs through the mail should retain their Fourth Amendment rights in 
those packages. While several circuit courts have identified this as an 
issue, none have resolved it. One district court has been able to conclude, 
unquestioned by the higher courts, that such people do not retain their 
Fourth Amendment rights in the packages. This Note disagrees: People 
who send drugs through the mail using criminal aliases have Fourth 
Amendment rights in those packages. Because of the growing opioid 
crisis in the United States, a crisis fueled in part by drug dealers exploiting
the dark web to send their customers dangerous illegal drugs through the 
mail, this Note does not end with an assertion that drug dealers should 
enjoy Fourth Amendment protections. Instead, this Note explores the 
exclusionary rule and how courts could apply it to combat the opioid 
crisis and dark web drug dealing.
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INTRODUCTION
Sending drugs through the mail may not seem like the best idea. 
However, it may be one of the safest ways to deal drugs, especially when 
coupled with the protections of the dark web. The dark web,1 a global 
online network that allows users to conduct transactions anonymously, 
                                                                                                                     
1. Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the 
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2017). The dark web requires a special browser to access 
it. Eric Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity and Online Policing, in GLOBAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, at 1 (Ser. No. 21, 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/
sites/default/files/no.21_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAG3-Y6R3]. One of the most popular 
browsers, Tor, allows users to send requests for a particular video, image, or other content to 
another computer in the Tor network, which then sends the request to another computer. Id. at 1–
2. That computer sends the request to another computer that then accesses the content and sends 
it through a chain of several other computers in the network until the requested information is 
finally sent to the requester’s computer. Id. at 2. By bouncing the information to different 
computers in this way, the internet service provider (ISP) for the requester can only see that the 
requester is sending a request to the first computer. Id. The ISP cannot see the requested content. 
Id. The website that contains the requested content can see the middle computer that accesses the 
content, but cannot see the requester’s computer, which is further down the chain. Id. This process 
makes it exceptionally difficult for someone to identify who the requester, and ultimate receiver, 
of the information is. Id. For additional protection and anonymity, buyers on the dark web use 
Bitcoin. Wade V. Davies, Bitcoin Criminals, 53 TENN. B.J. 24, 24 (2017). Bitcoin is a digital 
currency that can be exchanged for real currency. Id. When Bitcoin transactions are recorded, no 
personal information is recorded with the transactions. Id. 
2
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has attracted thousands of drug dealers.2 Customers purchase drugs 
through dark web marketplaces, and dark web drug dealers ship the 
products through the mail.3 The online transactions themselves are 
untraceable,4 and law enforcement may be further frustrated if the drug 
dealers use aliases to ship the packages. The Fourth Amendment also 
protects these drug transactions.5 Because the Supreme Court has held 
that mail sent through the United States Postal Service (USPS) is subject 
to Fourth Amendment protection,6 the United States Postal Inspection 
Service (USPIS)7 typically cannot search packages without first 
obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause.8 Several circuit 
courts have concluded that even when packages are addressed to an alias, 
the packages are subject to Fourth Amendment protection.9 But what if 
people use aliases solely for the purpose of doing something illegal, like 
shipping drugs through the mail?
Considering the prevalence of drugs in the mail,10 one would expect 
many court opinions on the issue of whether the criminal nature of an 
                                                                                                                     
2. One dark web marketplace that was recently shut down by law enforcement had over 
40,000 vendors and 250,000 listings for illegal drugs and toxic chemicals. AlphaBay, the Largest 
Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut Down, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down [https://perma.cc/9VPJ-M73T].
3. Nathaniel Popper, Opioid Dealers Embrace the Dark Web to Send Deadly Drugs by 
Mail, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/business/dealbook/
opioid-dark-web-drug-overdose.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/555H-V4FH]. A man in South
Florida pleaded guilty to drug charges, admitting he sold drugs through the dark web and shipped 
them using priority mail. Paula McMahon, South Florida ‘Dark Web’ Dealer Admits He Sold 
Drugs Online, Shipped Them Priority Mail, SUN SENTINEL (Oct. 28, 2016, 9:20 AM), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-drugs-dark-web-20161027-story.html [https://perma.cc/X2YD-
MT4G].
4. Ghappour, supra note 1, at 1079.
5. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970).
6. Id.
7. USPIS is a federal law enforcement agency that investigates crimes that affect or use 
the U.S. Mail, including transportation and distribution of drugs through the mail. Jurisdiction 
and Laws, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV., https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/98KE-LYHJ]; Mission Statement, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV.,
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/UN5U-WH7R].
8. See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 56 (2009).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992). 
10. In 2015, USPIS seized more than 37,000 pounds of illicit drugs. U.S. POSTAL 
INSPECTION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT: 2016 7 (2017), https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/radDocs/
2016%20AR%20FINAL_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/55Z9-4JZR]. It seems likely that many more 
pounds of illicit drugs traveled through the mail without being detected and seized by USPIS.
However, “no one knows just how much [illicit drugs] successfully make[ ] it through the Postal 
Service undiscovered.” Ross Scully, Can You Get Away With Mailing Cannabis Through the 
USPS?, LEAFLY (July 26, 2016), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/mailing-cannabis-
through-usps [https://perma.cc/RGZ4-228J].
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alias affects a person’s ability to invoke the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, but that is not the case. Four circuit courts have mentioned 
the issue, but none have resolved it.11 The circuit courts’ reluctance to
clearly answer this question has left district courts free to decide the issue 
on their own. One district court has done this, deciding that someone who 
uses an alias solely as part of a criminal scheme has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a package addressed to that alias, and thus has 
no Fourth Amendment protection.12 Another district court suggested that 
it may agree with that analysis, possibly even extending it to areas other 
than packages.13
In Part I, this Note discusses important Supreme Court cases related
to the issue of whether a package sent using a criminal alias is subject to 
Fourth Amendment protections and the circuit court cases that have 
established that the Fourth Amendment covers packages addressed to 
aliases in general.14 Additionally, Part I outlines two cases in which 
courts addressed whether the criminal nature of an alias affects Fourth 
Amendment rights: one court decided that the criminal nature of the alias
does affect Fourth Amendment rights; and one court indicated that the 
criminal nature of the alias is irrelevant when applying Fourth 
Amendment rights. Part II addresses the strengths and weaknesses of 
these two cases and argues for a proper resolution of whether a package 
sent using a criminal alias is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. In
Part III, this Note addresses the societal concern that has likely led courts 
to suggest that there should be no expectation of privacy in packages sent 
using criminal aliases: the dangers of drug trafficking. As the United 
                                                                                                                     
11. United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hicks, 59 F. 
App’x 703, 706–07 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 919, 919–20 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984).  
12. United States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
13. United States v. Martin, No. 10-20801-CR-JORDAN/O’SULLIVAN, 2011 WL 
13113271, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2011); United States v. Moncur, No. 10-20801-CR, 2011 WL 
3844096, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2011). These cases, both involving cellphones procured through 
an alias, discussed the possibility that an alias used solely for the purposes of a criminal scheme 
would defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy, but could not establish that the aliases were 
used solely as part of a criminal scheme.
14. These cases refer to addressees of a package. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d at 1238; 
Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 774; United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1981). This 
Note focuses solely on the senders of packages. Not only is it conceptually easier to focus on just 
senders, senders of illegal drugs are arguably more harmful to society than the recipients of those 
drugs, which allows for a more meaningful exploration of the issues involved in this Note. The 
courts’ reasoning in these cases should apply with equal force to senders of packages who use 
aliases; however, these cases are not critical to this Note’s conclusion. These cases simply provide 
contextual background for this Note.
4
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States faces the opioid crisis,15 the drug trafficking problem is especially 
salient. This Note argues that this societal problem should not be resolved 
as a matter of Fourth Amendment rights, but as an application of the 
exclusionary rule. In conclusion, this Note discusses the idea of a 
modified application of the modern exclusionary rule, which could 
further address the dangers of drug trafficking and the opioid crisis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: A Brief History
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is complex, and it has 
evolved over time. Originally, Fourth Amendment cases looked to the 
explicit text of the amendment16 and focused on property law concepts.17
The Court employed this method of analysis in Ex parte Jackson18 when 
it concluded that sealed letters and packages are subject to the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment.19 In that case, the Court stated that sealed 
packages in the mail are protected from inspection, except for inspection 
of the packages’ exterior and weight.20 The Court differentiated sealed 
packages and letters from other forms of mail that would not be subject 
to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, such as “magazines, 
pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be 
examined.”21 The Court applied the text of the Fourth Amendment—
specifically people’s right to be secure in their papers—to reach its 
conclusion.22 Later, in Olmstead v. United States,23 the Court continued
its use of strict textualism and held that wiretapping is not a search under 
                                                                                                                     
15. While the history of opioid abuse and potential crises is long-lasting and rampant 
throughout both American and global societies, the opioid crisis referred to throughout this article 
is that which led to the Department of Health & Human Services declaring a nationwide public 
health emergency in 2017. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public 
Health Emergency Exists, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/opioids.aspx [permalink]. See 
generally Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/FB8Z-
MKVT] (last updated Mar. 2018) (discussing the opioid crisis and its effects).
16. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621, 622 (1886), overruled by Warden 
v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
17. THOMAS K. KLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 83
(2d ed. 2014).
18. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).




23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 346 (1967).
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the Fourth Amendment.24 The Court based this decision on the premise 
that the Fourth Amendment only protects against physical invasions of 
real or personal property.25 Considering the Court’s history in deciding 
Fourth Amendment issues using property concepts, this was not 
surprising. 
In a landmark decision, Katz v. United States,26 the Court declared that 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”27overruling
Olmstead and seemingly doing away with property law concepts in 
deciding Fourth Amendment issues. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, 
established the new test for analyzing Fourth Amendment issues: (1) 
whether the person has a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) 
whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.28
In Katz, the Court focused its attention on privacy, rather than property,
interests.29
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence continued to evolve in Rakas v. 
Illinois.30 In Rakas, the Court abandoned the traditional Fourth 
Amendment standing analysis31 and instead analyzed whether the 
government invaded the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interest.32 The 
Rakas language has been taken to mean that if a defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, he could not 
                                                                                                                     
24. Id. at 466.
25. Id.
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Id. at 351, 353.
28. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz., MICH.
L. REV. 904, 904 (2004).
29. See KLANCY, supra note 17, at 88. 
30. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
31. Before Rakas, a person could challenge a search under two different theories that had 
nothing to do with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched: possession 
of what was seized or legitimacy of presence. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263 
(1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 488 U.S. 83 (1980). In Jones the Court ruled that 
the defendant, a guest in his friend’s apartment, had standing to challenge the search of that 
apartment. Id. at 259, 264, 265. The Court held that the defendant had standing to challenge the 
search because he was in possession of the contraband seized during the search. Id. at 264. 
Additionally, the Court held that the defendant had standing because he was legitimately on the 
premises where the search was conducted, and the results of the search were used against him. Id. 
at 265, 267. 
32. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. In case there was any doubt that the new “standing” rule in 
Rakas was the only way to challenge a Fourth Amendment search, the Court in United States v. 
Salvucci ruled that being in possession of the contraband seized was not enough, by itself, to grant 
the defendant the ability to challenge a search. 488 U.S. 83, 92, 96 (1980) (“We simply decline to 
use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.”).
6
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challenge the government’s search.33 The Court confirmed this 
interpretation of Fourth Amendment rights in United States v. Jacobsen,34
stating that a search “occurs when an expectation of privacy that society 
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”35 The cases in Sections
C and D, below, that discuss the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment 
protects packages sent with criminal aliases use the reasonable 
expectation of privacy language in their analyses.36
B. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Packages Sent to and 
from Aliases
The circuit courts which have ruled on the issue of Fourth Amendment 
rights in packages sent with aliases have concluded that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a package addressed to an alias. 
Unfortunately, these cases do not provide much insight into how the 
courts reached that conclusion. Because of this lack of thorough analysis, 
it is easy for district courts to carve out an exception for aliases used 
solely for criminal purposes.
In United States v. Richards,37 the Fifth Circuit concluded that there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to aliases.38
In this case, the defendant, Raymond Richards, opened a post office box 
under the name “Mehling Arts & Crafts.”39 Shortly after Richards was 
arrested, the government opened a package that was addressed and 
delivered to the “Mehling Arts & Crafts” mailbox,40 tested the contents 
of the package, and confirmed that it contained heroin—all without a 
warrant.41 Because the government was relying on the search results for 
its case-in-chief, whether the search was constitutional was a critical 
question.42 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by considering whether 
Richards met the Rakas standing requirement and had Fourth 
Amendment interest in the area searched.43 The court interpreted the 
Rakas requirement to mean that Richards must have had a “legitimate 
                                                                                                                     
33. Christopher Slobogin, Having it Both Ways: Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court Is 
“Unfairly” Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743, 745 (1996).
34. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
35. Id. at 113.
36. United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 459 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Walker, 20 F. 
Supp. 2d 971, 974 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
37. 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. See id. at 770.
39. Id. at 767.
40. Id. at 767, 768.
41. Id. at 768.
42. Id. at 769.
43. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
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expectation of privacy in the area searched.”44 The court reasoned that 
because the package was sealed, and because “Mehling Arts & Crafts” 
and Richards were essentially one and the same, Richards had a
legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus a Fourth Amendment interest,
in the package.45
The Fifth Circuit reiterated that there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in packages addressed to aliases in United States v. Villarreal,46
citing its decision in Richards.47 In Villarreal, the court extended that 
protection to two defendants because it was unclear to which defendant 
the alias belonged.48 The Eleventh Circuit reached the conclusion that a 
defendant could challenge the search of a package addressed to an alias 
in United States v. Garcia-Bercovich,49 limiting its analysis on the 
question to one sentence and simply citing Villarreal to support this 
conclusion.50
C. United States v. Walker: An Argument Against Fourth Amendment 
Rights in Packages Sent with Criminal Aliases
In United States v. Walker,51 the court concluded that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a package addressed to52 an alias 
used solely as part of a criminal scheme.53 The defendant tried to 
challenge the search of a package containing illegal drugs that was 
addressed to his alias.54 To reach its conclusion that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the package, the court relied on dicta 
                                                                                                                     
44. Richards, 638 F.2d at 769.
45. Id. at 770.
46. 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 774 (citing Richards, 638 F.2d at 770).
48. Id. at 775.
49. 582 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2009).
50. Id. at 1238 (citing Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 774).
51. 20 F. Supp. 2d 971 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
52. The court discussed addressees only because the factual scenario did not implicate 
people sending packages. Id. at 972. The nature of the court’s reasoning suggests that its 
conclusion applies with equal force to senders of packages who use aliases. If an addressee who 
uses an alias to receive packages does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy simply because 
he expects privacy in receiving his illegal goods, a sender who uses an alias to send drugs should 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy simply because he expects he will not get caught due 
to the use of the alias.
53. Id. at 974. Another court explained the significance of the alias being used solely as part 
of a criminal scheme. See United States v. Martin, No. 10-20801-CR-JORDAN/O’SULLIVAN, 
2011 WL 13113271, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2011) (clarifying that a defendant using an alias 
solely as part of a criminal scheme means the defendant used the alias for the purpose of 
frustrating law enforcement).
54. Id. at 972.
8
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from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.55 The Fifth Circuit simply stated, 
“Furthermore, even if we accept the Government’s assertion that ‘Lynn 
Neal’ was Daniel’s alias, we still question whether Daniel would have 
Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ to assert the claim, particularly when the 
use of that alias was obviously part of his criminal scheme.”56 The Eighth 
Circuit, in a lengthy footnote, offered a bit more analysis.57 The Eighth
Circuit likened a mailbox attached to a false name used to receive 
fraudulent mailings to a burglar breaking into a summer cabin during the 
off season:58 where the burglar expects he will not get caught because no 
one is present during the off season, the criminal who opens a post office 
box using an alias expects that the fraudulent mailings received through 
the alias will not be traced back to him. The Supreme Court has used this 
analogy twice, though in different contexts.59 Essentially, this analogy 
illustrates that just because someone expects that his activities are private,
society does not necessarily view those expectations as reasonable.60
In United States v. Jacobsen, an opinion on which the Eighth Circuit 
relied, the Court stressed the importance of society being prepared to 
recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable.61 The Walker court 
noted that the cases that state there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in packages addressed to aliases did not contradict its holding because 
those cases did not take the Court’s opinion in Jacobsen into account.62
D. United States v. Pitts: An Argument for Fourth Amendment Rights in 
Packages Sent with Criminal Aliases
In United States v. Pitts,63 the Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages sent or received 
using a criminal alias.64 In this case, Raymond Pitts mailed drugs through 
USPS using the name James Reed, Sr.65 The package was addressed to 
James Reed, Jr., though the intended recipient was really named Erik T. 
                                                                                                                     
55. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 973, 974 (citing United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 149 
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 919–20 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984)).
56. Daniel, 982 F.2d at 149.
57. Lewis, 738 F.2d at 919–20 n.2.
58. Id. at 920 n.2.
59. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 n.22 (1984) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978)); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12.
60. Lewis, 738 F.2d at 920 n.2. 
61. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122.
62. United States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
63. 322 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2003).
64. Id. at 459. For the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, this case did not 
differentiate between senders and addressees of packages. This helps illustrate that the analysis in 
the previous cases applies to both senders and addressees of packages.
65. Id. at 451.
9
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Alexander.66 The government intercepted this package, which eventually 
led to the arrest of both Pitts and Alexander.67 The two defendants moved 
to suppress the evidence found in the package, but the lower court denied 
the motion, concluding that the defendants did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the package because they had used aliases.68
While the Seventh Circuit decided the case on other grounds, it did 
discuss the alias issue in dicta.69 It stated that the nature of an alias, 
whether criminal or innocent, is irrelevant when analyzing whether 
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.70 The majority was responding to the concurrence’s 
assertion that society is not prepared to recognize a privacy interest in 
drugs sent through the mail using a false name.71 The majority noted there 
are two ways of looking at the concurrence’s conclusion.72 First, the 
concurrence could mean that because some people use false names for 
illegal reasons, everyone who uses a false name, even for legitimate 
purposes, must forfeit privacy rights in packages sent with those names.73
Second, the concurrence could mean that those who use aliases for 
legitimate reasons retain their privacy rights while those who use theirs 
for criminal purposes forfeit their privacy rights.74 This reasoning relies 
on an after-the-fact justification for the search, namely that drugs were 
found.75 The majority posited that this would allow law enforcement to 
enter anyone’s home without a warrant and, if drugs were found, justify 
the otherwise illegal search.76 The majority stated that neither of these 
outcomes comports with the Fourth Amendment.77 Further, the majority 
said that society is prepared to recognize that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a package sent or received using a false name.78
                                                                                                                     
66. Id.
67. Id. at 451, 453.
68. Id. at 453. Relying in part on the same dicta from United States v. Daniel that the Walker 
court relied on, the lower court concluded that society is not prepared to recognize a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a package sent using an alias as part of a criminal scheme. Id. The appeal 
was a prime opportunity for the Seventh Circuit to address the issue of whether a package sent 
using a criminal alias is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, but the court reached its 
conclusion on other grounds. See id. at 455–56 (finding that the defendants abandoned the 
property, thus forfeiting their Fourth Amendment rights).
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 458.
71. Id. at 460 (Evans, J., concurring). 




76. Id. at 458–59.
77. Id. at 458.
78. Id. at 459.
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/5
2018] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, DARK WEB DRUG DEALERS, AND THE OPIOID CRISIS 1107
After all, there is nothing inherently wrong with wanting to remain 
anonymous.79
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS VS. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. Walker: Ignoring Property Rights
As discussed above, the Walker court primarily supported its 
conclusion using United States v. Lewis80 and Jacobsen.81 While Katz 
established the concept that a person’s expectation of privacy must be one 
that society recognizes as reasonable,82 the Jacobsen Court perhaps made 
this concept a bit clearer when it stated, “A ‘search’ occurs when an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed” and illustrated this concept with the cabin analogy.83 By 
defining a search in this way, the Court was likely hoping to remove any 
doubts courts had about the proper analysis to apply in deciding Fourth 
Amendment issues. However, the Jacobsen Court really did not say 
anything new, or provide a uniquely clarifying opinion. Whether society 
is prepared to view the expectation of privacy as reasonable has always 
been a piece of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Even if 
the courts that concluded that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in packages addressed to aliases did not explicitly articulate this society 
prong, they did so implicitly by concluding there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Because of this, the Walker court’s argument that 
those cases do not conflict with its conclusion because those cases did not 
take Jacobsen into account84 ignores the implicit analysis in those cases.
Additionally, and more importantly, the Walker and Lewis courts 
ignored key language from the Rakas opinion, language that the Jacobsen 
court quoted in the portion of its opinion upon which Walker relied. In 
the very same footnote where the Rakas Court offered the burglar 
hypothetical, the Court went on to say, “Legitimation of expectations of 
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”85 The 
                                                                                                                     
79. Id.
80. 738 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1984).
81. United States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).
82. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 122, 122–23 n.22 (1984).
84. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (“The contrary Fifth Circuit decisions that hold 
individuals may assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to them under 
fictitious names are unpersuasive because they fail to consider the weighty factor voiced in 
Jacobsen, i.e., the extent to which the law and society should recognize subjective privacy 
expectations as reasonable.” (citations omitted)).
85. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978).
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Jacobsen Court fully quoted this portion of the Rakas opinion,86 but the 
courts in Walker and Lewis ignored it. This sentence from the Rakas 
opinion shows that there is more to the Fourth Amendment analysis, as 
well as more to the burglar analogy. It shows, as applied to the respective 
facts and analogies, that drawing similarities between a burglar and a 
person sending a package with an alias (even if it is to send drugs) is ill-
founded. 
The Walker and Lewis courts overlooked property law, and it is 
property law that undermines the analogy between a burglar robbing a 
summer cabin and someone using an alias to send drugs through the mail.
The burglar does not own the cabin and cannot assert property rights over 
it. Furthermore, society is not prepared to recognize that a burglar has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his victim’s home.87 In contrast, the 
drug dealer does have property rights in the package.88 As the Court said 
in Rakas, society either needs to be prepared to view the expectation of 
privacy as reasonable or there must be property rights.89 If the Court 
meant what it said in Rakas, then it does not matter that society is not 
prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in a package 
sent using an alias for the purpose of shipping drugs. It does not matter 
                                                                                                                     
86. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122–23 n.22 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12).
87. Even thinking about whether a burglar should have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his victim’s home brings up property law: one cannot help but think that the burglar should not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a victim’s home since it does not belong to the burglar 
and the burglar does not have permission to be there.
88. In Ex parte Jackson, the Court placed packages in the “papers” category of the property 
listed in the text of the Fourth Amendment. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (“Letters and sealed 
packages . . . in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were 
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the 
right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends 
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”). Additionally, in United 
States v. Jones, the Court suggested that a bailment would create sufficient property rights for 
challenging a Fourth Amendment search. 565 U.S. 400, 404 n.2 (2012). A strong argument can 
be made for why a bailment is created when a package is shipped through USPS. The Second 
Circuit stated that USPS has a bailment relationship with the senders of packages. Lerakoli, Inc. 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1986). Additionally, Justice Brennan 
and Justice Marshall characterized U.S. Postal workers as bailees. California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“Were it otherwise, a letter or package 
would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox . . . with the ‘express 
purpose’ of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier; those bailees are just as likely as 
trash collectors . . . to ‘sor[t] through’ the personal effects entrusted to them . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). Further, the Federal Government has waived sovereign immunity for loss and damage of 
packages sent through USPS, which suggests a bailment is created, even though the government 
does not explicitly state that in the statute or the case interpreting the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) 
(2012); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 489 (2006).
89. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
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because of the secondary basis for the Fourth Amendment protection: 
property rights.
B. Pitts: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis
The Pitts opinion is interesting because the court states that society is
prepared to recognize that an expectation of privacy in a package 
addressed to an alias, even for criminal purposes, is reasonable.90 The 
court made a compelling argument when it said the Fourth Amendment 
demands more than an after-the-fact rationalization for an otherwise 
illegal search.91 However, there are some problems with this argument. 
Namely, the Walker court’s burglar analogy could be used to rebut this 
argument. The conclusion that a burglar does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his victim’s home could also be an after-the-
fact rationalization for an otherwise illegal search. For example, police 
could illegally search a home, find the burglar inside, and the search 
would become legal, at least against the burglar. While this argument may 
seem ridiculous due to the odd nature of the analogy, the analogy is one
that the Supreme Court seems to approve of.92 Because the Pitts analysis 
could be countered by existing opinions, the stronger analysis for this 
issue is property rights.93
                                                                                                                     
90. United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 459 (7th Cir. 2003).
91. In Jacobsen, the Court placed packages in the “effects” category of the property listed 
in the text of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 114 (“Letters and sealed packages are in the general 
class of effects [under the Fourth Amendment] . . . .”). Additionally, in United States v. Jones, the 
Court suggested that a bailment would create sufficient property rights for challenging a Fourth 
Amendment search. 565 U.S. 400, 404 n.2 (2012). A strong argument can be made for why a 
bailment is created when a package is shipped through USPS. The Second Circuit stated that 
USPS has a bailment relationship with the senders of packages. Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1986). Additionally, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall 
characterized U.S. Postal workers as bailees. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) 
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“Were it otherwise, a letter or package would lose all 
Fourth Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox . . . with the ‘express purpose’ of 
entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier; those bailees are just as likely as trash 
collectors . . . to ‘sor[t] through’ the personal effects entrusted to them . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
Further, the Federal Government has waived sovereign immunity for loss and damage of packages 
sent through USPS, which suggests a bailment is created, even though the government does not 
explicitly state that in the statute or the case interpreting the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2012);
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 489 (2006).
92. For instances of the Supreme Court using this analogy, see United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 122–23 n.22 (1984) and Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12.
93. It is also the stronger analysis because property rights may be the only analysis one day. 
In a recent Fourth Amendment case, two Justices, including the newest member of the bench, 
questioned the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 
1531 (2018) (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring) (“I have serious doubts about the ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy test from Katz . . . .”).
13
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C. United States v. Jones: Further Support for the Property 
Rights Analysis
It would be easy enough to dismiss what the Court said in Rakas as 
dicta. However, in United States v. Jones,94 the Court made it clear that 
property rights are still at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.95 The test 
articulated in Jones did not eliminate the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test; it merely supplemented Katz by adding, or rather reviving, 
an alternative test.96
In Jones, the Court concluded that attaching a GPS tracking device to 
a car and gathering location data from that device was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.97 The Court stated that Katz did not eliminate
traditional trespassory invasions of constitutionally protected areas by the 
government from the definition of searches.98 The Court clarified the
trespassory invasion standard by stating that trespass alone does not 
constitute a search.99 The government must also have attempted to find 
something or to obtain information through the trespass.100 Additionally, 
the Court noted that unless a trespassory search is conducted upon one of 
the enumerated items in the Fourth Amendment—persons, houses, 
papers, and effects—it is not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections.101 In summary, to establish a search under the Jones test, a 
defendant must show that (1) the government trespassed (2) upon a 
person, house, paper, or effect (3) for the purpose of finding something 
or obtaining information. In reaching its conclusion that the facts of Jones
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court reasoned that a car is 
an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment.102 The Court further reasoned 
that the government physically intruded upon the car when it attached the 
GPS device.103 Finally, the Court noted that the government had done this 
in order to obtain information about the defendant’s location.104
Under the Jones analysis, a package sent using a criminal alias would 
be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. In United States v. Jacobsen,
                                                                                                                     
94. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
95. Id. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, 
since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ 
would have been superfluous.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
96. Id. at 411.
97. Id. at 404.
98. Id. at 409.
99. Id. at 408 n.5.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 411 n.8.
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the Court placed packages in the category of “effects” under the Fourth 
Amendment.105 Therefore, packages meet the property rights prong of the 
Jones analysis. If placing a GPS device on the underside of a car is a 
physical intrusion,106 opening a package is certainly a physical intrusion 
under Jones. Additionally, in a situation in which a USPIS agent would 
open a package, it no doubt would be to find contraband of some sort. 
Because all three requirements from Jones would be satisfied, the Fourth 
Amendment must protect packages sent through the mail from 
government intrusion without a warrant, regardless of whether the 
packages are sent using a criminal alias. 
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO COMBATING 
THE OPIOID CRISIS
A. Why Drug Dealers Should Retain Fourth Amendment Rights
As the United States faces the opioid crisis,107 giving drug dealers 
more Fourth Amendment protection may not seem attractive. This is 
especially true given that fentanyl, a substance substantially more 
dangerous than heroin,108 is often sold online and shipped through the 
mail.109 Why, then, should drug dealers retain their Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
105. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (“Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail 
are as fully guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were retained by the parties 
forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to 
be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”). Alternatively, the bailment argument could 
support property rights. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
106. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
107. See generally Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 15 (discussing the opioid crisis). The 
President has declared the opioid crisis a “national public health emergency.” Remarks by 
President Trump on Combatting Drug Demand and the Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 26, 
2017, 2:26 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
combatting-drug-demand-opioid-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/HC63-WZXM]. It is estimated that 
over 115 Americans die each day due to opioid overdoses. Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 
15. In 2015, the opioid crisis cost the U.S. economy approximately $504 billion, which accounts 
for 2.8% of the GDP. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE 
OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%
20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QVY-
3CWW].
108. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and sealed packages are 
in the general class of effects [under the Fourth Amendment] . . . .”). Alternatively, the bailment 
argument could support property rights. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
109. Popper, supra note 3; Buying Drugs Online: Shedding Light on the Dark Web,
ECONOMIST (July 16, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/international/21702176-drug-
trade-moving-street-online-cryptomarkets-forced-compete [https://perma.cc/8KF3-CLRC]
(stating that the amount of American customers on dark web drug websites increased from 8% in 
2014 to 15% in 2016). While the dark web still accounts for only a small percentage of all drug 
15
Stewart: The Fourth Amendment, Dark Web Drug Dealers, and the Opioid Crisi
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1112 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
rights when they ship drugs through the mail using aliases to avoid 
detection by law enforcement? There is more to the argument of why 
these drug dealers should retain their rights than the fact that, under Jones,
the Constitution and the Court require it.110 There is also more to this 
argument than the Court’s statement that it “is not empowered to suspend 
constitutional guarantees so that the Government may more effectively 
wage a ‘war on drugs.’”111 Legal reasons are, of course, compelling, but 
there are reasons with which people other than lawyers can sympathize.
If courts conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
packages shipped using criminal aliases, there will be no way to
differentiate between a petty criminal who shipped himself marijuana 
once while visiting Colorado and a dark web drug dealer whose fentanyl 
is killing people. If the government searched either person’s package 
without a warrant, there would be no Fourth Amendment violation, and 
both people would be charged with a crime with no means of objecting 
to the search or the use of the evidence found in the packages.
Law-abiding individuals would suffer as well. Law enforcement, 
knowing that packages shipped with criminal aliases are not subject to 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, would be free to search any 
package suspected of being sent with an alias for contraband.112 If 
                                                                                                                     
sales, the dark web drug market is growing quickly. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 2
(noting that the largest marketplace in 2017 had over 250,000 listings for illegal drugs, compared 
to the largest marketplace in 2013, which had 14,000 listings total, including non-drug 
contraband). One study found that dark web marketplaces quickly recovered from law 
enforcement takedowns, suggesting takedowns may be ineffective. Kyle Soska & Nicolas 
Christin, Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace 
Ecosystem, 24 USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 33, 47 (2015). In 2015, even after the most popular dark 
web drug marketplace was shut down by law enforcement in 2013, the dark web drug market was 
still making over $100 million per year in illegal drug sales. Andy Greenberg, Crackdowns 
Haven’t Stopped the Dark Web’s $100M Yearly Drug Sales, WIRED (Aug. 12, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/08/crackdowns-havent-stopped-dark-webs-100m-yearly-drug-
sales/ [https://perma.cc/G4Z3-DSA8]. After another dark web drug marketplace was shut down 
by law enforcement, a court filing stated the marketplace had made $450 million between May 
2015 and February 2017. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Forget Silk Road, Cops Just Scored Their 
Biggest Victory Against the Dark Web Drug Trade, FORBES (July 20, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/20/alphabay-hansa-dark-web-markets-
taken-down-in-massive-drug-bust-operation/#326d19cb5b4b [https://perma.cc/M59A-ZLCG].
Despite this victory, the FBI acknowledged there were still other active dark web drug markets 
and that more would soon become active. Id. 
110. See supra Part II.C. 
111. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
112. USPIS detection methods currently include package profiling and drug-sniffing dogs. 
Steven Nelson, Marijuana-Stuffed Mail Intercepts Hit Another High, Postal Inspectors Say, U.S.
NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:29 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/04/07/marijuana-
stuffed-mail-intercepts-hit-another-high-postal-inspectors-say. In that article, the inspector did 
not elaborate on what package profiling was, but cases provide some insight. See, e.g., United 
16
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contraband was found, law enforcement could conclude that the package 
was shipped with a criminal alias and prosecute the person with no 
repercussions. If the package contained, for example, a manuscript sent 
by an author under his pseudonym,113 law enforcement could tape it back 
up and send it on its way. People who send packages to their significant 
others using cute nicknames would be subject to having their packages 
searched. Overall, everyone who sent a package using an alias would lose
their privacy rights. Due to the nature of mail, this is an especially 
dangerous precedent because this infringement would occur behind 
closed doors in the Post Office, unbeknownst to the victims of the Fourth 
Amendment violation. Because of this, the victims could not seek any 
sort of vindication.114 How, then, can courts combat the opioid crisis 
while maintaining Fourth Amendment protections? The exclusionary rule 
provides an answer to this question.
B. The History of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule precludes a prosecutor from using evidence 
obtained through an illegal search or seizure in the prosecutor’s case-in-
chief.115 The Court first adopted the exclusionary rule for federal Fourth 
                                                                                                                     
States v. Huerta, 655 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that a United States Postal Inspector 
seized a package because the name of the sender was unrelated to the return address, the sender’s 
telephone number had been disconnected, the seams of the package were taped, the label was 
handwritten, it was sent from California, it was shipped from a post office with a different zip 
code than the return address, and one of the numbers on the return address had been scratched 
out). If a package is suspected to contain narcotics, USPS workers will send for a drug-sniffing 
dog. See, e.g., Christina Elmore, Drug Traffickers Find Anonymity via USPS, Private Mail 
Services, Authorities Say, POST & COURIER (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/
archives/drug-traffickers-find-anonymity-via-usps-private-mail-services-authorities/article_
dfb15016-0bfd-5742-a4cc-213400453fd3.html [https://perma.cc/PC9Q-LYPR]. Eliminating this 
step is likely attractive to law enforcement as calling a drug dog takes time and resources that 
could be saved if USPS workers could simply open a package sent using an alias. U.S. POSTAL 
INSPECTION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT: FY 2015 15 (2016), https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/
radDocs/2015%20AR(single).pdf [https://perma.cc/BRY7-DTGT] (stating that, in 2015, USPIS 
paid local law enforcement more than $10 million for their services, specifically noting canine 
services); see also United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that it 
took almost twenty-two hours to obtain a drug-sniffing dog to check a package).
113. This is similar to one of the examples used in Pitts to show that there are legitimate 
reasons for wanting to use an alias when shipping a package. See United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 
449, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2003).
114. In Bivens, the Court held that a person could be entitled to civil damages for injuries 
suffered as the result of a federal agent’s violation of that person’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Of course, one cannot bring a 
Bivens claim unless one knows one’s rights were violated.
115. KLANCY, supra note 17, at 725.
17
Stewart: The Fourth Amendment, Dark Web Drug Dealers, and the Opioid Crisi
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1114 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Amendment violations in Weeks v. United States.116 In that case, the 
United States Marshals searched the defendant’s room without a warrant 
and seized some papers.117 Upon the defendant’s request for an order that 
the government return the papers, the lower court ordered the District 
Attorney to return the papers not pertinent to the case, but allowed the 
District Attorney to keep pertinent ones.118 The Court stated that if 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment could be admitted 
at trial, the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.”119 The Court concluded that the lower court committed a 
prejudicial error when it allowed the papers to be used at trial.120 Weeks 
made it clear that the exclusionary rule was required by the 
Constitution.121
In Wolf v. Colorado,122 the Court waivered in its conclusion that the 
exclusionary rule was a constitutional requirement.123 After the Court 
found that the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the 
exclusionary rule should also be incorporated.124 The Court examined 
how the states had responded to the Weeks decision, noting that the 
majority of them rejected the use of the exclusionary rule.125 Holding that 
a state’s failure to use the exclusionary rule did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment,126 the Court reasoned that while the exclusionary rule may 
serve to deter law enforcement from infringing upon people’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, the states can use other means to deter law 
enforcement without using the exclusionary rule.127 This decision seemed
to divorce the exclusionary rule from the Constitution.
The Court changed its mind again in Mapp v. Ohio,128 concluding that 
the exclusionary rule was constitutionally required and must be 
                                                                                                                     
116. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)) (stating that the Court adopted the 
exclusionary rule in Weeks); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning 
the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 630 (2014).
117. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
118. Id. at 387, 388.
119. Id. at 393.
120. Id. at 398.
121. MCINNIS, supra note 8, at 184.
122. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
123. MCINNIS, supra note 8, at 184.
124. Wolf, 388 U.S. at 28.
125. Id. at 29.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id. at 31.
128. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.129 In Mapp, the Court 
stated that the constitutionality of the exclusionary rule “remains entirely 
undisturbed,” even after Wolf.130 The Court’s change of heart was due to 
the fact that since Wolf, the majority of states had adopted some form of 
the exclusionary rule from Weeks.131 Wolf rested partly upon the states’ 
overwhelming rejection of the exclusionary rule, but that factual 
consideration was no longer controlling.132 The Court also noted that 
California had expressed its frustration with trying to find a means of 
deterring law enforcement from committing Fourth Amendment 
violations other than the exclusionary rule.133 In addition to the States’ 
rejection of Weeks, the Wolf Court relied on the assumption that the states 
could employ other means of deterring law enforcement.134 The Mapp 
Court found California and other states’ experience compelling enough 
to conclude that methods other than the exclusionary rule are completely 
ineffective in deterring law enforcement from infringing upon people’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.135 After announcing its holding, the Court 
went on to say that the exclusionary rule is “an essential part of the right 
to privacy.”136 Beyond this, however, the Court did not specify where in 
the Constitution the exclusionary rule comes from.137
In Linkletter v. Walker,138 the Court emphasized the exclusionary 
rule’s purpose of deterring law enforcement from committing illegal 
searches and seizures.139 Because the purpose of the rule is to deter law 
enforcement from violating the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned 
that applying the rule retroactively would not further this purpose.140 The 
Court then concluded that violations of the exclusionary rule that 
occurred prior to Mapp would not be redressed.141
C.  The Modern Exclusionary Rule
Once again, the Court changed its stance on the constitutional nature 
of the exclusionary rule in United States v. Calandra.142 In that case, the 
                                                                                                                     
129. Id. at 655, 656; MCINNIS, supra note 8, at 185.
130. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 649.
131. Id. at 651.
132. Id. at 653.
133. Id. at 651.
134. Id. at 651–52 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949)).
135. Id. at 652.
136. Id. at 656.
137. MCINNIS, supra note 8, at 185.
138. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
139. Id. at 636–37.
140. Id. at 637.
141. Id. at 640.
142. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
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Court further stressed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
law enforcement from violating the Fourth Amendment, not to redress 
the defendant’s injury caused by the Fourth Amendment violation.143
After clarifying this purpose, the Court stated that the rule “is a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional 
right of the party aggrieved.”144 This makes it clear that the exclusionary 
rule is not a constitutional doctrine, despite what the Court said in the 
past. Because the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required, the 
Court has been able to create various exceptions to the rule.145 The 
rationale for these exceptions is the purpose of the exclusionary rule: 
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement.146
Like the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the modern approach to 
applying the exclusionary rule arose from the deterrence rationale and the 
conclusion that the rule is not constitutionally required. The modern 
analysis was first alluded to in Calandra147 and has been clarified by later 
cases.148 These cases establish that courts should not apply the 
exclusionary rule unless the deterrent effect of its application outweighs
the societal costs of applying it.149
1. Hudson v. Michigan
In Hudson v. Michigan,150 the Court found that the deterrent effect of 
applying the exclusionary rule did not outweigh the societal cost of 
applying it.151 In Hudson, law enforcement agents obtained a warrant to 
search a house for firearms and drugs.152 The defendant challenged the 
search on the grounds that the police did not wait long enough after 
                                                                                                                     
143. Id. at 347.
144. Id. at 348.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (adopting the good-faith 
exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery 
exception).
146. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”); Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (“If the 
prosecution can establish . . . that the information . . . inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be 
received.”).
147. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (referencing a “balancing process” in the application of 
the exclusionary rule).
148. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 596 (2006). 
149. Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
150. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
151. Id. at 599.
152. Id. at 588.
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/5
2018] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, DARK WEB DRUG DEALERS, AND THE OPIOID CRISIS 1117
announcing their presence to enter the house.153 This challenge was based 
on the common law knock-and-announce rule that requires law 
enforcement to give the occupants of a dwelling enough time to open the 
door themselves.154 As the Court began its analysis, it noted that the 
exclusionary rule “generates ‘substantial social costs,’” specifically 
noting that its application can result in guilty persons being set free.155
The Court then laid out the requirements necessary in order to apply the 
exclusionary rule: (1) but-for causation,156 (2) lack of attenuation,157 and 
(3) the deterrent effect on law enforcement outweighing the societal cost 
of application.158
Beginning with causation, the Court stated that but-for causation is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for application of the rule.159 But-
for causation means that the police would not have obtained the evidence 
but for the Fourth Amendment violation.160 The Court concluded that the 
police’s early entry into the house was not a but-for cause of obtaining 
the evidence, reasoning that since the police had a proper warrant, they 
would have obtained the evidence regardless.161
Further, the Court stated that even if there is direct but-for causation, 
the effects of the Fourth Amendment violation must not be attenuated.162
Attenuation can occur in two circumstances: (1) when the causal 
connection is too remote, and (2) when the interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment would not be served by application of the 
exclusionary rule.163 The Court focused its analysis on the second 
circumstance.164 If the protected interests would not be served, then there 
is attenuation and the exclusionary rule should not be applied.165 The
Court differentiated Hudson, in which a valid search warrant was 
obtained, from a case in which there was no warrant and the search was 
purely illegal, concluding that application of the exclusionary rule in the 
latter case would vindicate Fourth Amendment interests, while 
application in the former case would not.166 The Court reasoned that the 
                                                                                                                     
153. Id.
154. Id. at 589.
155. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
156. Id. at 592.
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 596.
159. Id. at 592.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 593.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 593–94.
165. Id. at 593.
166. Id. 
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interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule, which was violated 
in Hudson,167 are different from those protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.168 The knock-and-announce rule protects “human life and 
limb,” property, and a specific type of privacy.169 On the other hand, the 
Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s “‘persons, houses, papers, 
and effects’ from the government’s scrutiny” without a valid warrant.170
Because the interests implicated in this case were not those protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, application of the exclusionary rule was not
appropriate.171
The Court went on to explain what else is needed, beyond but-for 
causation and lack of attenuation, for proper application of the 
exclusionary rule—this is where the deterrence/societal cost balancing 
test comes into play.172 In this case, the Court concluded that the cost to 
society would be great because, not only would application of the 
exclusionary rule allow a criminal to go free, but it would also lead to a
spate of similar challenges.173 The Court reasoned that application of the 
exclusionary rule in this case could create a “get-out-of-jail-free card” in
subsequent cases.174 Finally, applying the exclusionary rule to this case 
could result in police officers waiting too long to enter a house after 
announcing themselves, thus exposing the officers to more danger.175
Additionally, the Court concluded that any deterrent effect did not 
outweigh the societal cost.176 The Court reasoned that ignoring the knock-
and-announce rule really has no adverse effects, so deterring law 
enforcement from violating it achieves little.177 There are also other 
methods of deterrence, such as a civil suit against the police for the 
violation.178 The Court noted that the civil suit alternative has gained 
more strength since Mapp because Congress authorized attorney’s fees 
for a prevailing plaintiff, and because more public-interest attorneys are 
                                                                                                                     
167. Id. at 590.
168. Id. at 593.
169. Id. at 594 (“[A]n unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by 
the surprised resident. . . . The knock-and-announce rule gives individuals ‘the opportunity to 
comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry.’ . . . 
[T]he knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be 
destroyed by a sudden entrance.” (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997))).
170. Id. at 593 (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
171. Id. at 594.
172. Id. at 594–96.
173. Id. at 595.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 599.
177. Id. at 596.
178. Id. at 597–98.
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willing to take on such cases.179 The Court also reasoned that growing 
professionalism within police forces would have a deterrent effect.180
Violations of the knock-and-announce rule, the Court reasoned, would be 
dealt with internally through disciplinary action.181 Because of the 
minimal deterrent effect that the application of the exclusionary rule 
would have on knock-and-announce violations, the other means of 
deterrence for such violations, and the substantial societal cost of 
application, the Court concluded application of the exclusionary rule was
not appropriate.182
2. Herring v. United States
In Herring v. United States,183 the Court once again found that the 
deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule did not outweigh its
societal cost.184 In Herring, a police investigator asked a warrant clerk to 
search for any outstanding warrants for the defendant’s arrest in the
immediate jurisdiction and a nearby jurisdiction.185 This search revealed 
an outstanding warrant in the nearby jurisdiction.186 Based on this
information, the investigator arrested the defendant and found drugs and 
a gun in the defendant’s vehicle during a search incident to the arrest.187
Unfortunately, it turned out that the warrant was no longer outstanding;
it was mislabeled as active due to a clerical error.188 Because of this, the 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the vehicle 
search.189
Before diving into its analysis of the case, the Court reiterated its view 
on the exclusionary rule.190 The Court stated that the exclusionary rule is 
judicially created and is not a constitutional requirement.191 It emphasized 
that the purpose of the rule is to deter police misconduct.192 Additionally, 
the Court stated that application of the exclusionary rule should be a “last 
resort, not our first impulse.”193 The Court emphasized the great weight 
                                                                                                                     
179. Id.
180. Id. at 598–99.
181. Id. at 599.
182. Id.
183. 555 U.S. 135 (2008).
184. Id. at 144.
185. Id. at 137.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 138.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 139–40.
191. Id.
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 140 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
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of the societal cost of letting guilty and potentially dangerous criminals 
go free.194
In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed the importance of police 
culpability when applying the cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary 
rule.195 The more serious and deliberate the police misconduct, the more 
likely it is that the deterrent effect outweighs the societal cost of 
application.196 Specifically, the Court stated, “[T]he exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in 
some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”197 The Court then 
concluded that the conduct in Herring was not serious enough to warrant 
application of the rule,198 as it was merely an isolated incident of 
negligence, not systemic negligence or recklessness.199
3. Utah v. Strieff
The attenuation doctrine, which the Court mentioned in Hudson v. 
Michigan,200 appeared again in Utah v. Strieff.201 In Strieff, a police 
officer detained the defendant without reasonable suspicion, which 
rendered the detention illegal.202 During the stop, the police officer 
discovered an outstanding warrant and arrested the defendant pursuant to 
that warrant.203 Incident to this arrest, the officer searched the defendant 
and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia.204 The defendant attempted 
to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained due to an illegal stop.205
The Court began its analysis by outlining the attenuation doctrine: 
“Evidence is admissible when the connection between the 
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been 
interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest 
protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not 
                                                                                                                     
194. Id. at 141 (“[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives 
presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.” (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998))).
195. Id. at 143.
196. Id. at 144 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence 
is worth the price paid by the justice system.”).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 137, 147.
200. 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).
201. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
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be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’”206 The issue in 
Strieff was whether discovery of a valid pre-existing warrant attenuated
the discovery of the evidence from the Fourth Amendment violation.207
The Court identified three factors that should be considered when 
applying the attenuation doctrine: (1) “‘temporal proximity’ between the 
unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how 
closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search”; 
(2) “the presence of intervening circumstances”; and (3) “the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct.”208 The third factor harkens back to 
the balancing test and police culpability that the Court stressed in 
Herring,209 which may be why the Court in Strieff identified the third 
factor as the most important.210
After identifying these factors, the Court began its analysis.211 Under 
the first factor alone, the drugs and drug paraphernalia in Strieff would 
likely have been suppressed because the discovery of the evidence closely 
followed the unconstitutional search.212 Previous cases found that the first 
factor favors attenuation only when “‘substantial time’ elapses between 
an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained,”213 and in this case, 
the officer’s illegal act and the search occurred within minutes of each 
other.214 The second factor weighed in favor of finding attenuation under 
the Court’s analysis.215 Since the warrant was valid, predated the illegal 
stop, and the officer had an obligation to arrest the defendant upon 
discovering the warrant, the Court reasoned the search was indisputably 
lawful after the arrest pursuant to the warrant.216 Finally, the Court 
concluded that the third factor weighed in the State’s favor.217 The Court 
reasoned that the officer’s illegal stop was at most negligent and therefore
did not rise to the level of purposeful or flagrant.218 Additionally, after 
this negligent (albeit illegal) stop, the officer’s actions were lawful.219
The Court also noted that this was apparently an isolated incident and not 
                                                                                                                     
206. Id. at 2061 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)).
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 2062 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)).
209. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2008).
210. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2062–63.
217. Id. at 2063.
218. Id. The Court rejected the defendant’s counterargument that the officer stopped the 
defendant for the purpose of finding evidence of wrongdoing, accepting that the officer stopped 
the defendant for information on what was happening inside a drug house. Id. at 2064. 
219. Id. at 2063.
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systemic police misconduct.220 Based on this analysis, the Court held that 
applying the exclusionary rule would be improper.221
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor expressed concern about the 
precedent set by the majority.222 Justice Sotomayor wrote, “This case 
allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, 
and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing 
nothing wrong.”223 She went on to say, “If the officer discovers a warrant 
for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and 
will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you 
after arresting you on the warrant.”224
Justice Kagan’s dissent attacked the majority’s conclusion based on 
the Court’s previous emphasis on deterring police misconduct through 
application of the exclusionary rule.225 Justice Kagan believed the 
majority’s result would incentivize police misconduct.226 Like Justice 
Sotomayor, Justice Kagan imagined that the Strieff opinion would
increase the occurrence of stops despite a lack of reasonable suspicion.227
Whether or not the dissenting opinions are correct, considering the 
current composition of the Supreme Court bench,228 it does not seem like 
this 5-3 opinion will change in the near future, and this is the current state 
of the exclusionary rule.
                                                                                                                     
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2074.
227. Id.
228. On April 7, 2017, the Senate confirmed President Trump’s conservative Supreme Court 
nominee, Neil M. Gorsuch. 163 CONG. REC. S2442–43 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2017). Justice Gorsuch 
replaced the late Justice Antonin Scalia, and legal scholars believe that Gorsuch will follow in 
Scalia’s conservative footsteps. Alex Swoyer, Neil Gorsuch an Ideal Antonin Scalia Replacement, 
Conservative Legal Scholars Say, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/31/neil-gorsuch-ideal-scalia-replacement-
conservative/ [https://perma.cc/V6BZ-YS43]. Additionally, as of the writing of this Note, another 
President Trump nominee, Brett Kavanaugh, is awaiting a Senate confirmation vote. Erin Kelly, 
Brett Kavanaugh: Senate Judiciary Panel Will This Month, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2018, 6:39 
P.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/10/brett-kavanaugh-senate-
judiciary-panel-vote-month/1260756002/ [https://perma.cc/R9C6-XMV7]. Kavanaugh is known 
for his many conservative opinions. See 164 CONG. REC. S6014–15 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2018) 
(statement of Sen. Schumer). If Kavanaugh is confirmed, the majority of the Court will be 
conservative, so opinions like Strieff will likely be around for a long time.
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D. The Exclusionary Rule Applied to Evidence Obtained by Illegally 
Searching the Mail
The previously discussed precedent suggests that courts should no 
longer feel compelled to conclude that mail sent using criminal aliases is
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Since the exclusionary rule 
is not a constitutional requirement,229 evidence illegally obtained from 
one of these packages does not automatically lead to a dangerous drug 
dealer being set free. Under Herring, if law enforcement conduct is not 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” then application of the 
exclusionary rule is unnecessary and improper.230 Whether police 
conduct rises to the level of culpability necessary to trigger the 
application of the exclusionary rule should be determined on a case-by-
case basis, but certain circumstances would likely fall below this level. 
For example, if USPIS agents mistakenly believed that a search warrant 
was valid because a clerical error indicated validity where there was none,
a court likely would not apply the exclusionary rule. Like in Herring, a 
court would find this conduct was merely negligent, which would not rise 
to the requisite level of police culpability.
Consider, as an example, a situation in which a trained drug-detection 
dog identifies a potentially suspicious package through a sniff. Under 
Strieff, an officer’s mistake in believing there is reasonable suspicion to 
seize a package for the dog sniff, as in Walker,231 may not rise to the level 
of culpability required to exclude any evidence the officer found after he 
obtained a search warrant. The dog sniff created probable cause for the 
warrant, so the warrant is valid on its face. Even though the initial seizure 
may be unconstitutional due to the lack of reasonable suspicion, like the 
initial detention of the defendant in Strieff, the search would be based on 
a valid warrant, like the search in Strieff. Also like Strieff, the officer in 
this hypothetical was merely negligent because he mistakenly believed 
there was reasonable suspicion to seize the package.
In Strieff, the warrant was already outstanding, unlike in the above 
hypothetical, but the Court noted that the third factor—police 
culpability—is the most important.232 Therefore, this difference may be 
of no consequence to the analysis. The officer mistakenly believed he had 
reasonable suspicion in this hypothetical, so his conduct only rose to the 
                                                                                                                     
229. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
230. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2008).
231. United States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp. 2d 971, 972 (S.D.W. Va. 1998). The Walker court 
did not decide whether there was reasonable suspicion. However, these were the facts that led the 
court to ultimately conclude that the defendant had no Fourth Amendment rights in the package 
because the package was addressed to his criminal alias. Id. at 974.
232. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
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level of negligence, which should not be enough to apply the exclusionary 
rule. In fact, if the Strieff analysis fails because obtaining a valid warrant 
after the constitutional violation is not enough to find attenuation,233 this 
hypothetical can be resolved in the government’s favor by applying the 
doctrine from Herring.
It is also likely of no consequence that the first factor identified in 
Strieff—temporal proximity—weighs in favor of applying the 
exclusionary rule. Since the illegal seizure happened shortly before 
getting the dog to find probable cause for the warrant, a court looking at 
temporal proximity alone would apply the exclusionary rule. In Strieff,
however, the Court noted that the temporal proximity was also too close, 
but that did not matter because the other factors weighed in favor of not 
applying the exclusionary rule.234 Therefore, in this hypothetical, it
should not matter that the temporal proximity factor does not weigh in 
the government’s favor. If Walker had been decided after Strieff, or even 
Herring, the court in Walker could have applied Strieff or Herring to deny 
the motion to suppress the drugs instead of concluding that the defendant 
had no Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
The modern exclusionary rule cases underscore the importance of 
police culpability in applying the deterrence/societal cost balancing 
test.235 In all these cases though, the Court also repeatedly stresses the 
great societal cost of applying the exclusionary rule.236 These modern 
                                                                                                                     
233. In Strieff, the Court did stress the fact that the warrant was already outstanding, so courts 
may be unwilling to extend Strieff beyond the specific facts in that case. Id. at 2062–63. 
Additionally, extending Strieff to a warrant obtained after the constitutional violation would erode 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine more than Strieff did. Courts apply this doctrine to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement’s Fourth Amendment violation when the 
obtainment of that evidence is not sufficiently attenuated from the violation. See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). In United States v. Place, the Court applied the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine to suppress evidence found in a suitcase after the government illegally 
seized it, then got a dog that alerted to it in order to obtain a warrant to search it. 462 U.S. 696, 
699, 710 (1983) (suppressing the evidence found based on the warrant obtained through the dog 
sniff because the seizure of the luggage was unreasonable). Of course, that case was decided long 
before Strieff, and the illegal seizure was the result of purposeful police conduct, so the facts in 
Place are very different from the hypothetical in the level of police culpability. See id. (explaining 
that the agents seized the luggage after the defendant refused to give consent for the search and 
took the bags to the Kennedy airport for the dog sniff without informing the defendant where they 
were taking it, which resulted in a seizure of 90 minutes before the warrant was obtained).
234. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062–63.
235. See, e.g., id. at 2062; Herring, 555 U.S. at 143.
236. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (“[T]he significant costs of this rule have led us to deem it 
‘applicable only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’” (quoting 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006))); Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (“[T]he rule’s costly 
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cases have slowly chipped away at the exclusionary rule’s power. 
It has not yet happened, but the next step in this jurisprudence would 
be to conclude that the exclusionary rule should not apply in certain cases,
based not on lack of police culpability but instead on the seriousness of 
the offense charged. This would allow courts to apply the exclusionary 
rule in, for example, a case where the defendant sends marijuana to his 
home in Georgia while visiting Colorado, because the societal harm is 
insubstantial. The same court could then deem application of the 
exclusionary rule inappropriate in a case where a dark web drug dealer 
sends dangerous illicit substances throughout the country, leading to the 
deaths of some of his customers. In each of these cases, the police could 
be equally culpable in searching these packages by not following proper 
Fourth Amendment procedure, but the outcomes would be different based 
on the respective societal harm.
The dissenting Justices in Strieff would no doubt reel at this. It favors 
law enforcement and perhaps incentivizes police misconduct, just as the
dissenting Justices thought the decision in Strieff would.237 They might 
argue that this type of exclusionary rule analysis is just as dangerous as 
destroying all Fourth Amendment rights in packages addressed to 
criminal aliases. What would stop USPIS from opening every package 
and keeping only those packages that contain particularly dangerous 
drugs or those that contain drugs in especially large amounts? Based on 
a single package alone it would be impossible to differentiate between a 
serious dark web drug dealer and someone who sends drugs through the 
mail to himself in an isolated incident. From law enforcement’s
perspective, it does not seem like the risk would outweigh the reward. 
Each wrong guess about the seriousness of the illegal activity would open 
up law enforcement to tort liability, resulting in great costs to the agency 
or personally to the agent who committed the violation.238 No, contrary 
                                                                                                                     
toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging 
[its] application.” (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998))); 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (“The exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs,’ which 
sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
237. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2074 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
238. By bringing a Bivens claim, the defendant could recover damages, including punitive 
damages, from the federal agent personally. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21, 22 (1980) (noting 
that a Bivens claim has a deterrent effect on police misconduct). If a state police department had 
a policy of violating Fourth Amendment rights in this way, § 1983 would apply, allowing a cause 
of action for the violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 
(1999) (“Both Bivens and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages from government 
officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 
(1992) (“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to 
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such 
deterrence fails.”). Additionally, the Court noted civil suits for constitutional violations have more 
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to what the Strieff dissenting justices might argue, shifting the 
exclusionary rule analysis is not as dangerous as destroying Fourth 
Amendment rights completely.
                                                                                                                     
teeth than they did in the past, so they more effectively serve their deterrent purpose now. See 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98.
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